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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Ronnie Gene Kincaid, Jr., appeals from his judgment of conviction for second-
degree murder.  He challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Kincaid held down his wife, Melissia, and violently thrust a foreign object into her 
vagina, severely injuring her and causing her to bleed to death.  (PSI, pp. 3, 46-48, 49-52.)  
The autopsy revealed Melissia died of “[e]xsanguination due to massive vaginal and rectal 
trauma.”  (PSI, p. 50.)  Kincaid’s attack resulted in “[m]assive penetrating trauma involving 
the vaginal canal with tearing of tissues extending from the clitoris all the way through the 
floor of the vagina, to connect with the rectum with massive tearing of the rectal mucosa.”  
(Id.)  The object Kincaid used tore “through the left lateral wall” of Melissia’s vagina and 
into the “retroperitoneal tissues on the left side” causing “extensive hemorrhage” and 
trauma extending “approximately 6 to 8 inches” “into the muscle and soft tissues of the 
lateral wall of the pelvic cavity and abdominal cavity.”  (Id.)  Kincaid also inflicted “[b]lunt 
force trauma” to Melissia’s head.  (PSI, pp. 50-51.)  Four children were in the home and 
could hear Melissia “screaming” as Kincaid brutalized her.  (PSI, p. 3.) 
 The state charged Kincaid with first-degree murder, mayhem, two counts of 
penetration with a foreign object, and destruction or concealment of evidence, with a 
persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp. 85-88, 91-94.)  Kincaid later entered an Alford 
guilty plea to a reduced charge of second-degree murder.  (R., pp. 143-54.)  The district 
court scheduled the sentencing for June 9, 2017.  (R., p. 155.)  The PSI was lodged with 




Five days after the PSI was lodged, and two days before the scheduled sentencing 
hearing, Kincaid’s trial attorney filed a motion to withdraw from representation because 
Kincaid had decided to file a motion to withdraw his plea, a position “directly at odds with 
[counsel’s] legal advice and recommendation.”  (R., pp. 159-63.)  Filing a motion to 
withdraw the plea would be a breach of the plea agreement, which would free the 
prosecution to make any sentencing recommendation it wanted to.  (R., p. 150; see 6/9/17 
Tr., p. 8, Ls. 4-17.)  The district court denied the motion to withdraw.  (R., p. 164.) 
Kincaid filed his motion to withdraw his plea, offering as grounds for the motion: 
(1) the court had not yet indicated “an intent to follow the proposed Rule 11 Agreement”; 
(2) a “wish” that he not “be judged and convicted of intentionally killing his wife upon his 
own admission”; and (3) a “good faith belief” that “there is a chance” a jury would not 
convict him.  (R., pp. 168-71.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the district court noted 
that Kincaid had raised a new issue: that counsel “informed him” that he “would not be 
further representing him if he did not accept the plea agreement.”  (7/17/17 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 
3-21.)  Because the new issue was not raised in the motion, the district court took the matter 
under advisement.  (7/17/17 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 16-25.)  The district court subsequently filed a 
written order denying the motion to withdraw.  (R., pp. 197-211.) 
The case proceeded to sentencing with different counsel representing Kincaid.  (R., 
pp. 214, 221-29, 232, 275-76, 283-84.)  The district court imposed a sentence of life with 
20 years determinate for second-degree murder.  (R., pp. 285-87.)  The district court also 





(R., pp. 277-82.)  Kincaid filed a timely notice of appeal from the entry of the judgment.  








 Kincaid states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Kincaid’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
 
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. 
Kincaid to pay two fines of $5,000 pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
5307? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Kincaid failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion 
that Kincaid’s claim that his counsel threatened to withdraw from representation if Kincaid 
did not take the plea agreement did not show that his plea was coerced? 
 








Kincaid Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His Motion To 




 The district court denied Kincaid’s motion to withdraw his plea.  (R., pp. 197-211.)  
On appeal Kincaid argues that the district court erred because his “plea was not voluntary 
because his counsel threatened to withdraw if he did not plead guilty.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 7.)  This argument fails because it is incorrect on the law and because it fails to address 
the district court’s analysis. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to whether 
the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action.”  
State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing 
State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)).  An appellate 
court will defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial 
competent evidence.  State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. 
State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Kincaid’s Plea Was Not Coerced 
 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea “may be made only before sentence is imposed 
or imposition of sentence is suspended.”  I.C.R. 33(c).  Although a district court’s 
discretion should be “liberally exercised” when ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty 




automatic right.  State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535, 211 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 
2008).  Rather, “the defendant has the burden of showing a ‘just reason’ exists to withdraw 
the plea.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Failure to present and support a just or plausible reason, 
even absent prejudice to the prosecution, will weigh against granting withdrawal.  State v. 
Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004).  “[T]he good faith, 
credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions in support of his motion to withdraw 
his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.”  Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d 
at 782 (citations omitted).   
“The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine 
whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.”  Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 
1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)).  A plea was made voluntarily where the record shows the 
defendant “understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced.”  State v. Flowers, 
150 Idaho 568, 572, 249 P.3d 367, 371 (2011). 
The district court rejected Kincaid’s claim that his guilty plea was not voluntary 
because “his counsel told him that he would withdraw as his attorney if he did not accept 
the plea deal.”  (R., pp. 203-04.)  The court applied the legal standards in Hollon v. State, 
132 Idaho 573, 577, 976 P.2d 927, 931 (1999), and State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483-84, 
961 P.2d 251, 253-54 (1993).  (R., pp. 203-04.)  Pursuant to Hollon, the court found 
counsel’s statement regarding withdrawal was not coercive.  (R., p. 203.)  Pursuant to 
Dopp, the court concluded that Kincaid’s decision to accept the plea agreement and plead 
guilty was voluntary and not the result of the statement.  (R., pp. 203-04.)  The district 




In Hollon defense counsel informed his client that he “would not represent him in 
a trial, believing that if Hollon went to trial, he would likely spend the remainder of his life 
in prison.”  132 Idaho at 575, 976 P.2d at 929.  Hollon asserted that his counsel was 
ineffective because the threat to withdraw coerced him into pleading guilty.  Id. at 576, 976 
P.2d at 930.  The Court pointed out that Hollon did not:  
assert that there was insufficient time for a new attorney to be appointed 
who could adequately represent him at trial or that [counsel] did not make 
him aware that new counsel could be appointed. Hollon‘s main contention 
appears to be that he wanted his chosen attorney to represent him at trial 
and if his attorney was not willing to do so, he was prepared to forego his 
right to a trial. 
 
Id. at 577, 976 P.2d at 931.  The Court acknowledged that someone “in Hollon‘s position 
might feel that they were being abandoned by counsel,” but that counsel should be allowed 
to withdraw “without then rendering a client’s subsequent decision to enter into a guilty 
plea involuntary.”  Id.  The Court cited the Fifth Circuit, which stated that counsel “‘acting 
in good faith and affording sound representation’” has the right to “‘ask the court to allow 
him to withdraw as counsel and have another counsel appointed’” who is “‘more 
sympathetic to trial’” if the client refuses to accept his advice to accept a plea agreement.  
Id. (citing Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir. 1987)).  Indeed, not informing 
a client of such intentions would “‘withhold a material and significant fact from the accused 
when the accused was undertaking to decide whether or not to accept the plea bargain.’”  
Id. (citing Uresti, 821 F.2d at 1102).  The Court affirmed the finding that counsel’s 
performance was not deficient.  Id. at 577-78, 976 P.2d at 931-32.   
 This case is indistinguishable from Hollon in any meaningful way.  Like Hollon, 
Kincaid “did not support his allegations” with “anything beyond the threat of counsel to 




for a new attorney” to prepare for trial, or that counsel did not inform him that other counsel 
would represent him.  Id. at 577, 976 P.2d at 931. Like Hollon, Kincaid’s position “appears 
to be that he wanted his chosen attorney to represent him at trial and if his attorney was not 
willing to do so, he was prepared to forego his right to a trial.”  Id.  Finally, like Hollon, 
Kincaid did not “state that he felt coerced.”  Id. at 577, 976 P.2d at 931.   
 Kincaid’s mere claim that counsel “told [him] that if [he] took this to trial, [counsel] 
would quit” (7/17/17 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 1-4; see also p. 9, Ls. 9-17) did not show coercion any 
more than Hollon‘s nearly identical claim showed deficient performance.  The district court 
correctly concluded that the Hollon decision foreclosed Kincaid’s claim.   
 Kincaid contends the district court “failed to apply this Court’s most recent 
precedent in reaching its decision and therefore abused its discretion.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 11.)  Specifically, Kincaid argues that State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 297 P.3d 244 
(2013), “implicitly overruled Hollon.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  Review shows this 
argument to be without merit.   
 The facts and law in Hollon are set forth above, but relevant to this case is that 
Hollon claimed his counsel was ineffective for threatening to withdraw if Hollon did not 
accept a plea agreement.  Hollon, 132 Idaho at 577, 976 P.2d at 931.  The Court specifically 
set forth what Hollon had not claimed: that there was insufficient time for new counsel to 
prepare for trial, that he was unaware that new counsel would be appointed to represent 
him, and that he in fact felt coerced by counsel’s statement.  Id.  These facts match those 
in this case, because Kincaid did not claim that new counsel could not have been prepared 
for trial, that he was unaware that new counsel could be appointed to represent him at trial, 




 In comparison, the facts of Grant are that his counsel moved to withdraw, asserting 
that “communications had broken down” after Grant refused his advice to accept a plea 
agreement.  154 Idaho at 283, 297 P.3d at 246.  The district court, focusing on “the key 
question of whether [counsel] could competently represent Grant at trial despite their 
disagreement regarding the plea agreement,” denied the motion.  Id.  In finding no abuse 
of discretion, the Court stated that “counsel may not withdraw merely because his client 
refuses to plead guilty, or because another attorney might possibly be able to convince the 
client to plead guilty.”  Id. at 285, 297 P.3d at 248 (citing Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 
962, 971 (9th Cir. 2008), by “see” citation).  Even treating this language in Grant as a 
holding, there is no obvious way that a holding that a court does not abuse its discretion by 
denying a motion to withdraw “merely because his client refuses to plead guilty” overrules 
Hollon.  Whether the court would have granted the threatened motion to withdraw is 
ultimately of little, if any, consequence in deciding whether counsel coerced a guilty plea 
by threatening to move to withdraw. 
 Kincaid argues that, because the Court in Grant cited to Nehad, a case he believes 
is contrary to Hollon, Hollon is no longer good law.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10).  Kincaid 
does not show how the holdings of Hollon or Grant are incompatible.  Indeed, the two may 
be easily reconciled.  Hollon stands for the proposition that a threat to withdraw if the client 
does not accept a plea agreement is not enough alone to show that the plea was coerced.  
132 Idaho at 577, 976 P.2d at 931.  Grant stands for the proposition that a client’s refusal 
to accept a recommended plea agreement is not enough alone to justify withdrawal. 154 




 Even if citing Nehad (with a “see” cite) were sufficient to infer adoption of its legal 
standard regarding whether a threat to withdraw can be deemed coercive (which it is not), 
such would not show Hollon to be overruled.  In Nehad the Ninth Circuit noted that “it is 
widely held that counsel’s threatening to withdraw can render the plea involuntary.”  535 
F.3d at 971 (emphasis added).  The Court in Hollon recognized as much when it 
specifically noted that Hollon had not alleged more than the threat to withdraw, such as 
that there was insufficient time for new counsel to prepare for trial or that Hollon was 
unaware that new counsel would be appointed.  132 Idaho at 577, 976 P.2d at 931.  Both 
the Ninth Circuit case of Nehad and, more importantly, the Idaho case of Hollon recognize 
that a threat to withdraw might be coercive based on the facts of the case. 
 But not the facts of this case. The district court’s analysis included noting that, 
during the plea colloquy, Kincaid “admitted under oath that his plea was not coerced,” 
stated that “he was not pressured by anyone to enter into the plea,” stated that no one 
“coerced him into entering into the plea,” and “never advised the court at the change of 
plea that his attorney’s threat of withdrawal pressured him to enter his plea.”  (R., p. 204.)  
The district court applied the correct legal standard to the record and found “it was clear” 
that Kincaid’s plea was voluntary.  (R., p. 204.) 
 The district court’s determination is supported by the record.  In the plea agreement 
Kincaid represented that he believed that the agreement was in his “best interest,” and that 
he had “weighed the risks and consequences of proceeding to jury trial” and believed that 
entering the plea agreement was “a better course of action.”  (R., p. 153.)  He further 
represented that he was “satisfied with the performance and advice of defense counsel.”  




plea, Kincaid testified that no one told him he “had to take” the plea agreement, that the 
plea agreement was satisfactory to him, and that no one had “pressured [him] in any way 
into making or taking this deal.”  (4/20/17 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-11.)  He further testified that he 
was entering the plea of his “own free will and volition,” that he was “satisfied with the 
services of [his] attorney,” and that no one had “pressured” him or “coerced” him “in any 
way into entering into this plea.”  (4/20/17 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 4-20.)  Kincaid represented that 
there was nothing he asked his attorney to do that was not done.  (4/20/17 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 
23-25.)  When the court asked Kincaid if he wanted a jury trial, Kincaid answered, under 
oath, “No, sir.”  (4/20/17 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 1-3.)  The record supports the district court’s 
determination that the record made it “clear” Kincaid’s plea was entered voluntarily.  (R., 
p. 204.) 
 Kincaid’s argument that Hollon was implicitly overruled by Grant does not 
withstand analysis.  The district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on Hollon as 
authority.  Moreover, the district court’s analysis based on the facts of this case is well 
supported. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Kincaid 
had failed to demonstrate that his guilty plea was coerced. 
 
II. 
The Fine Provided By I.C. § 19-5307 Applies To The Felony Conviction 
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court ordered a $5,000 fine pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307 to each of the 
victim’s two surviving children.  (R., pp. 277-82.)  Kincaid claims the court erred by 




applies the fine per conviction.  The civil judgments should be vacated and the case 
remanded so that a single judgment for $5,000 can be entered. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over which 
the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 
1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
C. The $5,000 Civil Fine Applies Per Felony 
 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.  State 
v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 
Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).  Because the best guide to legislative intent is the 
wording of the statute itself, the interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.  
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).  The words of a statute “‘must 
be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a 
whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows 
the law as written.’”  Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 
139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)).  “[W]here statutory language is 
unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for 
the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”  Id. (quoting City of 
Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
The statute provides that the court “may impose a fine not to exceed five thousand 




of this section.”  I.C. § 19-5307(1).  The resulting “civil judgment … shall be entered on 
behalf of … the family of the victim in cases of homicide.”  Id.  Because the fine attaches 
to the finding of guilt of “any” qualifying felony, and Kincaid was found guilty of one 
qualifying felony, a homicide, the district court was authorized to impose only one civil 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction, but 
to vacate the civil judgments and remand for entry of a single civil judgment on behalf of 
the family of the victim. 
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